In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who tries to learn the distribution of outcomes from previously observed cases. For each observed database of cases the decision-maker predicts a set of priors expressing his beliefs about the underlying probability distribution. We impose a version of the concatenation axiom introduced in BILLOT, GILBOA, SAMET, AND SCHMEI-DLER (2005) which ensures that the sets of priors can be represented as a weighted sum of the observed frequencies of cases. The weights are the uniquely determined similarities between the observed cases and the case under investigation. The predicted probabilities, however, may vary with the number of observations. This generalisation of BILLOT, GILBOA, SAMET, AND SCHMEIDLER (2005) allows one to model learning processes.
Introduction
How will existing information in uence probabilistic beliefs? How do data enter the inductive process of determining a prior probability distribution? KEYNES (1921) discusses in great detail the epistemic foundations of probability theory. In particular, in Part III of his "A Treatise on Probability", he critically reviews most of the then existing inductive arguments for this probability-generating process.
Randomized statistical experiments with identically repeated trials represent an ideal method of data collection. In this case, decision makers can aggregate information directly into a probability distribution over unknown states. In most real-life decision problems, however, decision makers do not have available data derived from explicitly designed experiments with suf ciently many identical repetitions. Usually, they face the problem to predict the outcome of an action based on a set of data which may be more or less adequate for the decision problem under consideration. This requires aggregating data with different degree of relevance. The case-based decision making approach of GILBOA AND SCHMEIDLER (2001) offers a systematic way to deal with this information aggregation problem: to evaluate an action, the outcomes of past observations are summed up, weighted by their perceived degree of relevance, their similarity to the current decision situation.
In a recent paper, BILLOT, GILBOA, SAMET, AND SCHMEIDLER (2005 ), henceforth BGSS (2005 , show that, under few assumptions, a probability distribution over outcomes can be derived as a similarity-weighted average of the frequencies of observed cases. Moreover, GILBOA, LIEBERMAN, AND SCHMEIDLER (2006) demonstrate how one can estimate the similarity weights from a given database.
The case-based approach in BGSS (2005) associates a database with a single probability distribution. Furthermore, the probability distribution depends only on the frequency of observations in the data, but not on the length of the database. This approach appears satisfactory if the database is large and if the cases recorded in the database are clearly relevant for the decision problem under consideration. Indeed, BGSS (2005) note also that this approach "... might be unreasonable when the entire database is very small. Speci cally, if there is only one observation, [....] However, for large databases it may be acceptable to assign zero probability to a state that has never been observed." (BGSS (2005) , p. 1129)
In particular, this approach restricts the decision maker to being a frequentist, but allows the weights assigned to the frequencies to depend on the perceived relevance of the cases. Two important aspects of the decision situation are, however, neglected. First, even if the decision maker is able and willing to assign a probability distribution to each database, this distribution might vary both with the frequency and the length of the database, as for instance in Bayesian updating. Second, in the face of ambiguity, the decision maker might nd himself unable to pinpoint a unique probability distribution.
In this paper, we modify the approach of BGSS (2005) in two ways. First, we allow the prediction of the decision maker to depend both on the frequency and on the length of the database. This allows us to capture the idea that, controlling for the frequency, longer databases contain more precise information and to incorporate Bayesian updating as a special case of our analysis. Second, we allow the predictions to be represented by a convex set of probability distributions to capture the idea that information can be ambiguous.
O'HAGAN AND LUCE (2003) describe the dif culty of making and interpreting point predictions about probabilities as follows:
"The rst dif culty we will face is that the expert will almost certainly not be an expert in probability and statistics. That means it will not be easy for this person to express her beliefs in the kind of probabilistic form demanded by Bayes' theorem. Our expert may be willing to give us an estimate of the parameter, but how do we interpret this? Should we treat it as the mean (or expectation) of the prior distribution, or as the median of the distribution, or its mode, or something else? [...] We could go on to elicit from the expert some more features of her distribution, such as some measure of spread to indicate her general level of uncertainty about the true value of the parameter." (pp. 64-65) .
While decision makers might be unable to make point predictions about a prior distribution, they may be able to identify a range of possible probabilities, either directly as upper and lower bounds of probabilities, or indirectly by a degree of con dence expressed regarding a point prediction. In the former case, a convex set of probabilities is suggested directly, in the latter case, one may view the set of probabilities as a neighborhood of an imprecise point prediction.
The decision maker's ambiguity can be related to the length of the database (insuf cient number of observations) or to the content of the data (observations which do not exactly correspond to the case for which a prediction has to be made). The rst type of ambiguity is relevant even in the perfect case of randomized statistical experiments. Consider, e.g., a decision maker observing random draws with replacement from an urn containing black and white balls in unknown proportions. After one white and two black balls have been drawn out of the urn, the decision maker might entertain a set of priors describing his beliefs about the constitution of the urn. This set might include the observed frequency , but it might also contain other distributions, e.g., , if the decision maker considers the number of observations to be insuf cient to generate an exact prediction. This type of ambiguity will disappear as the number of observations grows.
The second type of ambiguity arises in situations in which the data contains relevant, but not identical cases to the one, for which a prediction has to be made. A case often discussed in the econometrics literature is the one of missing variables, see MANSKI (2000) , as well as Example 1 in GONZALES AND JAFFRAY (1998). For instance, medical studies often contain large sets of data, but fail to record potentially important characteristics, such as the gender of the patients. MANSKI (2000) argues that in this case, the probability distribution over outcomes cannot be point-identi ed. Hence, the data is consistent with a set of probability distributions which will be non-degenerate even as the number of observations becomes large.
Our model provides a representation which allows for both types of ambiguity. To obtain this, we modify the main axiom of BGSS (2005) , Concatenation, by restricting it to databases of equal length, i.e., thus controlling for the ambiguity resulting from insuf cient amount of data.
In order to establish a connection between the predictions for databases of different lengths, we introduce an additional axiom -"Learning". It captures the idea that, as information accumulates, the changes in the forecast caused by additional con rming observations get smaller and smaller. If the perceived ambiguity is due to a limited number of observations, the set of pre-dictions converges to a singleton. However, the axiom does not exclude the case of persistent ambiguity, when predictions converge to a non-degenerate set of beliefs. This distinction between ambiguity which vanishes with a suf ciently large number of observations and ambiguity which remains for any number of observations corresponds to a similar distinction in EPSTEIN AND SCHNEIDER (2007) .
Despite these modi cations, our approach obtains a similarity function which is unique and independent of the content and the size of the databases. This property is a central feature of the representation in BGSS (2005) . Hence, as in BGSS (2005), frequentism and kernel classi cation represent special cases of our representation. However, our approach captures a broader scope of rules, including Bayesianism and full Bayesian updating on a set of priors.
Moreover, it allows us to model persistent ambiguity arising from missing or inadequate data.
There exist several approaches as to how a decision maker, whose forecast consists of a set of probability distributions, can select a prior from this set 1 . Among these, the max-min rule suggested by GILBOA AND and MANSKI (2000) is by far the most popular. It selects the probability distribution which results in minimal expected utility for the speci c action. Our approach allows us to establish a connection between the set of priors and the selection of a single probability distribution used to evaluate a speci c act. We show that whenever the sets of priors which the decision maker associates with different databases satisfy the axioms of our model, so do the probability distributions determined according to the max-min rule.
As in BGSS (2005), the question remains open which decision criterion one should use given the decision maker's beliefs. In order to obtain a decision rule together with a multiple prior representation one may embed these ideas in a behavioral model in the spirit of GILBOA, SCHMEIDLER, AND WAKKER (2002) or derive decision criteria re ecting degrees of optimism or pessimism in the face of ambiguity as in the work of COIGNARD AND JAFFRAY (1994) and GONZALES AND JAFFRAY (1998) . We propose such a behavioral approach in EICHBERGER AND GUERDJIKOVA (2008) . We believe, however, that a characterization of the mapping H from databases to probabilities over outcomes is desirable in its own right. It opens up the possibility to study the optimal use of data for the derivation of a set of prior distributions and to model databased learning rules.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 outlines the model and Section 4 provides some motivating examples. In Section 5, we state the axioms. Section 6 presents the main result. In Section 7, we collect some examples which illustrate our approach and show that it is compatible with an array of popular statistical methods. Section 8 concludes the paper. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Related Literature
There are several ways to model ambiguity of a decision maker in the literature. A representation of ambiguous beliefs by means of capacities was introduced by SCHMEIDLER (1989).
For convex capacities, this approach coincides with the multiple prior approach advanced in GILBOA AND . BEWLEY (1986) derives a set of probability distributions from incomplete preferences. These multiple-prior approaches were developed further by GHIRARDATO, MACCHERONI, AND MARINACCI (2004) and Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) . KLIBANOFF, MARINACCI, AND MUKERJI (2005) model ambiguity attitudes by a second-order probability distribution over a set of probability distributions. All these multiple-prior approaches represent ambiguity by a set of probability distributions which a decision maker considers when evaluating her expected utility. In the spirit of these models, we model ambiguity by a set of probability distributions over outcomes. The degree of ambiguity can be measured by set inclusion. The smaller the set of probability distributions over outcomes, the less ambiguous the prediction.
In GILBOA AND SCHMEIDLER (1989) the set of priors is purely subjective. In contrast, several recent papers, AHN (2008) , GAJDOS, HAYASHI, TALLON, AND VERGNAUD (2007), STINCHCOMBE (2003) , provide a framework to analyze decisions in situations in which the set of priors is objectively given. This allows them to distinguish objectively given Knightian uncertainty from the subjective attitude towards ambiguity. In our framework, a similar distinction is achieved differently. The decision maker associates with each database a set of probability distributions, which take into account both the objective information contained in the data (i.e. the nature and frequency of cases observed, as well as the number of observations) and the subjective degree of ambiguity. Thus, our approach provides a method to characterize sets of subjective priors related to the data-generating process.
MARINACCI (2002) (2007) distinguish two types of scenarios: one in which it is possible to learn the objective probability distribution and another where ambiguity is persistent. They study the effect of prior information on the learning process in the context of statistical experiments in the spirit of ELLSBERG (1961) . If information about the colors of a given number of balls in an urn is obtained from "sampling with replacement", such "learning" will reveal the proportions of colors in the long run. In contrast, if the composition of the color in the urn is changing over time, e.g., in Scenario 3 of EPSTEIN AND SCHNEIDER (2007) (p. 1279) because a certain number of balls is replaced by an administrator in every period, then learning by sampling with replacement cannot reveal the true proportions of colors and ambiguity will prevail even in the long run.
EPSTEIN AND SCHNEIDER (2007) show also how these types of ambiguity induce different investment behavior in a portfolio choice model.
Our framework uses the notion of similarity to distinguish between controlled statistical experiments, and situations in which relevant, but not completely identical cases have been observed.
If the observed cases are identical to the case under consideration, as in a controlled statistical experiment, e.g., in Scenarios 1 and 2 of EPSTEIN AND SCHNEIDER (2007) , then the decisionmaker will be able to learn the objective probability distribution satisfying the ergodicity property. When, however, the observed cases are distinct from the situation under consideration, as in Scenario 3, then ambiguity may persist in form of a limit set of probabilities, even if a large number of data has been collected. Yet, sampling may still provide information, though the decision maker has to judge its relevance based on some presumption about the administrator's behavior.
GONZALES AND JAFFRAY (1998) model preferences over Savage-type acts for a given set of, possibly imprecise, data. They derive a representation of preferences in form of a linear combination of the maximal and the minimal potential outcome of an act and its expected utility with respect to the observed frequency of states. The weights attached to the maximal and minimal outcomes can be interpreted as degrees of optimism and pessimism. They decrease over time relative to the weight attached to the expected utility part of the representation. Because observations may be imprecise a decision maker associates with a set of data a set of priors centered around the observed frequency. The size of the set of probabilities depends negatively on the amount of data. While we do not derive a decision rule from behavior, our approach encompasses a richer class of situations which is not restricted to the case of controlled statistical experiments considered in both COIGNARD AND JAFFRAY (1994) and GONZALES AND JAFFRAY (1998).
The Model
The basic element of a database is a case which consists of an action taken and the outcome observed together with information about characteristics which the decision maker considers as relevant for the outcome. We denote by X a set of characteristics, by A a set of actions, and by R a set of outcomes. All three sets are assumed to be nite. A case c = (x; a; r) is an element of the nite set of cases C = X A R. A database of length T is a sequence of cases indexed by t = 1:::T :
The set of all databases of length T is denoted by
set of databases of arbitrary length.
Consider a decision maker with a given database of previously observed cases, D, who wants to evaluate the uncertain outcome of an action a 0 2 A given relevant information about the environment described by the characteristics x 0 2 X: Based on the information in the database D; the decision maker will form a belief about the likelihood of the outcomes. We will assume that the decision maker associates a set of probability distributions over outcomes R,
with the action a 0 in the situation characterized by x 0 given the database D 2 D:
Formally, H : D X A ! jRj 1 is a correspondence which maps D X A into non-empty, compact and convex subsets of jRj 1 : As usual, the convex combination of two sets of probability distributions H and H 0 is de ned by H+(1 )
Elements of this set are denoted by h (D j x 0 ; a 0 ) and we write h r (D j x 0 ; a 0 ) for the probability assigned to outcome r by the probability distribution h (D j x 0 ; a 0 ).
We interpret H (D j x 0 ; a 0 ) as the set of probability distributions over outcomes which the decision maker takes into consideration given the database D.
Motivating Examples
The following examples illustrate the broad eld of applications for this framework. They will also highlight the important role of the decision situation (x 0 ; a 0 ):
The rst example is borrowed from BGSS (2005).
Example 4.1 Medical treatment
A physician must choose a treatment a 0 2 A for a patient. The patient is characterized by a set of characteristics x 0 2 X, e.g., blood pressure, temperature, gender, age, medical history, etc. Having observed the characteristics x 0 , the physician evaluates a treatment a 0 based on the assessment of the probability distribution over outcomes r 2 R. A set of cases D observed 2 in the past may serve the physician in this assessment of probabilities over outcomes.
A case c = (x t ; a t ; r t ) is a combination of a patient t's characteristics x t , treatment assigned a t and outcome realization r t recorded in the database D: Given the database D, the physician considers a set of probabilities over outcomes, H (D j x 0 ; a 0 ) jRj 1 , as possible. These probability distributions represent beliefs about the likelihood of possible outcomes after choosing a treatment a 0 for the patient with characteristics x 0:
In general, the physician will form his beliefs based on cases in which characteristics potentially different from x 0 and actions potentially different from a 0 were observed. E.g., O'HAGAN AND LUCE (2003)(PP. 62-64) discuss how information from different studies about the effectiveness of similar, but not identical, drugs can be combined into a prior distribution.
Two problems can prevent the physician from specifying a unique probability distribution for a speci c treatment. First, he might have few observations, and, therefore, doubt that the observed frequencies are representative of the population as a whole. Second, the observations might not be identical to the case at hand (e.g., the physician might have a vast amount of data on patients with u symptoms, which allows him to evaluate different treatments, however, he might consider all these cases to be of only limited relevance when faced with the symptoms of swine u). While in the rst situation, collecting more data of the same type would reduce the ambiguity, in the second, the ambiguity is due to incomplete understanding of the relation between different cases.
Consider, e.g. a situation in which some of the characteristics contained in X were not recorded.
As in MANSKI (2000) , suppose that in a study that contains the outcomes of a speci c treatment, the gender of the patient is not recorded 3 . Suppose that the treatment resulted in success for exactly 50% of all cases. A physician who has to assign a treatment to a woman will not be able to infer from the database which of the following scenarios corresponds to the truth:
(i) the treatment is always effective for men, but never for women; (ii) the treatment is always effective for women, but never for men; (iii) the treatment is successful in 50% of cases, for both genders (of course many more intermediate cases are possible). Even after observing a very large database, the physician will be completely ignorant of the probability of success, and his prediction will be represented by the interval [0; 1]. Here, the fact that the cases in the data are not completely identical to the case at hand gives rise to sets of probability distributions.
As a second application we will consider classic statistical experiments where the decision maker bets on the color of the ball drawn from an urn.
Example 4.2 Lotteries
Consider three urns with black and white balls. There may be different information about the composition of these urns. For example, it may be known that there are 50 black and 50 white balls in urn 1, there are 100 black or white balls in urn 2, there is an unknown number of black and white balls in urn 3.
We will encode all such information in the number of the urn, x 2 X = f1; 2; 3g.
In each period a ball is drawn from one of these urns. A decision maker can bet on the color of the ball drawn, fB; W g: Assume that a decision maker knows the urn x 0 from which the ball is drawn, when he places his bet a 0 . An action is, therefore, a choice of lottery a 2 A := f1 B 0; 1 W 0g, with the obvious notation 1 E 0 for a lottery which yields r = 1 if E occurs and r = 0 otherwise.
Suppose the decision maker learns after each round of the lottery the color of the ball that was drawn. Since there are only two possible bets a = 1 B 0 or a 0 = 1 W 0 we can identify cases c = (x; a; r) by the urn x and the color drawn B or W: Hence, there are only six cases C = f(1; B); (1; W ); (2; B); (2; W ); (3; B); (3; W )g:
Note that for a given urn x, the observation of a case, allows the decision maker to observe the outcome of the actually chosen action, but also to infer the (counterfactual) outcome of the lottery he did not choose. This is a speci c feature of this example, which distinguishes it from Example 4.1.
Suppose that, after T rounds, the decision maker has a database D = ((1; B); (3; W ); :::; (2; B)) 2 C T .
With each database D, one can associate a set of probability distributions over the color of the ball drawn fB; W g or, equivalently, over the payoffs f1; 0g given a bet a: Suppose a decision maker with the information of database D learns that a ball will be drawn from urn 2 and places the bet a 0 = 1 B 0, then he will evaluate the outcome of this bet based on the set of probability distributions H (D j 2; a 0 ) : This set should re ect both the decision maker's information contained in D and the degree of con dence held in this information. For example, as in statistical experiments, the decision maker could use the relative frequencies of B and W drawn from urn 2 in the database D and ignore all other observations in the database. Depending on the number of observations of draws from urn 2, say T (2), recorded in the database D of length T , the decision maker may feel more or less con dent about the accuracy of these relative frequencies. Such ambiguity could be expressed by a neighborhood " of the frequencies
) of black and white balls drawn from urn 2 according to the records in the database D: The neighborhood will depend on the number of relevant observations T (2), e.g.,
. (1) This set of probabilities over outcomes H (D j 2; a 0 ) may shrink with an increasing number of relevant observations. Example 4.2 illustrates how information in a database may be used and how one can model ambiguity about the probability distributions over outcomes. In this example, we assumed that the decision maker ignores all observations which do not relate to urn 2 directly. If there is little information about draws from urn 2, however, a decision maker may also want to consider evidence from urn 1 and urn 3, possibly with weights re ecting the fact that these cases are less relevant 4 for a draw from urn 2. The representation derived in the next section allows for this possibility.
Axioms
In this section, we will take the decision situation (x 0 ; a 0 ) as given. We will relate the frequen-
to sets of probabilities over outcomes H(D j x 0 ; a 0 ). In particular, let H T (D j x 0 ; a 0 ) be the restriction of H(D j x 0 ; a 0 ) to databases of length T . We will impose axioms on the set of probability distributions over outcomes H (D j x 0 ; a 0 ) which will imply a representation of the following type: for each T 2 and each database of length T ,
The set of probability distributions over outcomesP 
The axioms we introduce below imply that s ( j x 0 ; a 0 ) is unique (up to a normalization) and does not depend on T , while the sets of probability distributionsP
uniquely. This result generalizes the main theorem of BGSS (2005) to the case in which beliefs depend on the number of observations and can be expressed as sets of probability distributions over outcomes.
In the following discussion, (x 0 ; a 0 ) is assumed constant. Hence, we suppress notational reference to it and write
and s (c j x 0 ; a 0 ), respectively. It is important to keep in mind, however, that all statements of axioms and conclusions do depend on the relevant reference situation (x 0 ; a 0 ). In particular, the similarity weights, deduced below, measure similarity of cases relative to this reference situation.
In order to characterize the mapping H(D) we will impose axioms which specify how beliefs over outcomes change in response to additional information. In general, it is possible that the order in which data become available conveys important information. We will abstract here from this possibility and assume that only data matter for the probability distributions over outcomes.
Axiom A1 (Invariance) Let be a one-to-one mapping : f1:::T g ! f1:::T g, then
.
According to Axiom (A1), the set of probability distributions over outcomes is invariant with respect to the sequence in which data arrive. Hence, each database D is uniquely characterized by the tuple (f D ; T ), where f D 2 jCj 1 denotes the vector of frequencies of the cases c 2 C in the database D and T is the length of the database, i.e. D 2 D T .
Remark 5.1 By Axiom (A1), we can identify every database D = (c t )
T t=1 with the corresponding multi-set
o , in which the number of appearances of every case c exactly corresponds to the number of its appearances in D. We will denote the database and its corresponding multi-set by the same letter. In particular, when we write D = D 0 , we mean equality of the multi-sets corresponding to the databases D and D 0 .
In line with BGSS (2005), we call the combination of two databases a concatenation.
De nition 5.1 (Concatenation) For any T , T 0 2 N, and any two databases D = (c t )
is called the concatenation of D and D 0 .
By Axiom (A1), concatenation is a commutative operation on databases. The following notational conventions are useful.
denotes k concatenations of the same database D: In particular, a database consisting of k-times the same case c can be written as c k :
Imposing the following Concatenation Axiom, BGSS (2005) obtain a characterization of a function h mapping D into a single probability distribution over outcomes.
for some 2 (0; 1):
This axiom can be easily adapted to our framework:
for some 2 (0; 1).
Both versions of the axiom imply that, for any k, the databases D and D k map into the same set of probability distributions over outcomes,
and D 0 = c 10000 will be regarded as equivalent. This seems counter-intuitive. Ten thousand observations of the same case c = (x; a; r) are likely to provide stronger evidence for the outcome r in situation (x; a) than a single observation. Suppose, that we restrict the prediction to be single-valued, e.g., because the decision maker is a Bayesian. Unless, the decision maker's prior assigns a probability of 1 to outcome r, this decision maker will assign a higher probability to outcome r under D 0 than under D. If, in contrast, the decision maker considers the situation to be ambiguous, we could argue that the database c 10000 provides a strong evidence for a probability distribution concentrated on the outcome r; h r (c 10000 ) = 1. Based on a single observation (x; a; r), however, it appears quite reasonable to consider a set of probability distributions H(c)
which also contains probability distributions h(c) with h r 0 (c) 2 (0,1) for all r 0 : In particular, based on the information contained in D = (c), a decision maker may not be willing to exclude the case of all outcomes being equally probable, i.e., h(D) with h r 0 (D) = 1 jRj for all r 0 2 R: It appears perfectly reasonable to include h in H (c) but not in H (c 10000 ).
Since we would like to capture the fact that con dence might increase as the number of observations grows, we cannot simply apply the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) to concatenations of arbitrary databases D and D 0 . Restricting the axiom to databases with equal length will provide suf cient exibility for our purpose.
To illustrate the idea, consider two cases c 1 and c 2 and databases with two observations of these cases, say D 1 = (c 1 ; c 1 ); D 2 = (c 2 ; c 2 ); and F = (c 1 ; c 2 ): Due to Axiom (A1), one can write these databases in terms of frequencies and numbers of observations as F = (f F ; 2);
c 2 ) = F F holds, the frequency of cases in F must be a mixture of the frequencies of D 1 and D 2 ;
Whatever the predictions H(D 1 ) and H(D 2 ); which the decision maker expresses based on the databases D 1 and D 2 ; the prediction for the database F = (c 1 ; c 2 ) should in some sense lie between H(D 1 ) and H(D 2 ): Formally, we will require the existence of a 2 (0; 1) such that
Axiom (A2) generalizes this idea: for any n databases of equal length T that can be concatenated to an n-fold of a database F of length T , we postulate that any probability distribution over outcomes predicted on the basis of database F can be expressed as a convex combination of probability distributions over outcomes associated with the databases D i .
Axiom A2 (Concatenation restricted to databases of equal length) Consider databases F 2
In spirit, Axiom (A2) is very similar to the Concatenation Axiom introduced by BGSS (2005) .
It has the following intuitive interpretation 6 : if a decision maker cannot exclude a certain probability distribution h after observing the evidence in any of the databases D 1 :::D n , then he should not be able to exclude it after observing the evidence in a database of the same length, F , the frequency of which is a mixture of the frequencies of D 1 :::D n . The main difference to the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) is that we restrict the axiom to databases of equal length.
6 Note that the Axiom does not have the following behavioral implication: if action a is preferred to a 0 under all databases D 1 :::D n , then it is also preferred under F . To understand this, consider the case of n = 2. Let a % D1 a 0 and a % D2 a 0 . Suppose also that the evidence contained in database D 1 is more relevant for a, while the evidence contained in D 2 is more relevant for a 0 . Suppose that, at the same time, the decision maker values a 0 higher given the relevant evidence contained in D 2 than he values a, given the relevant evidence for this action, D 1 . In this case, combining the evidence contained in the two databases D 1 and D 2 into F might lead to a reversal of preferences, i.e., a The restriction to sets of equal length is important for our approach since databases with identical frequencies, but different length may give rise to different sets of probabilities over outcomes. In particular, depending on some learning rule (e.g. full Bayesian updating, see Section 7), it may be reasonable to assume that the set of probabilities is non-degenerate, but converges towards the observed frequency of outcomes as more observations of the same cases become available. Intuitively, the decision maker becomes more con dent that the observed frequencies re ect the actual data-generating process for the database
applying the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005), we would have to conclude that for some
for all k 2 N: Thus, imposing BGSS (2005)'s Concatenation Axiom, the set of probability distributions over outcomes would necessarily be independent of the number of observations.
Our weaker Axiom (A2), however, implies in this case only
, which is trivially satis ed for any set D.
Axiom (A2) allows us to identify the similarity function. In general, however, similarity will depend on the length of the database. In order to prevent this, we impose
Independence of the similarity function from the number of observations is justi ed if one assumes that the similarity of cases is determined by some primitive knowledge about the cases, which is not based on the information contained in the database 7 . We discuss this axiom and its implications in Section 7.4.
The following axiom requires learning processes to be stable. If the number of observations of the same case c case increases, beliefs about the outcome of (x 0 ; a 0 ) will react less to each additional observation and will eventually settle on a (possibly singleton) set of probability distributions.
Axiom A4 (Learning) For every c 2 C, the sequence of sets H T c T converges 8 .
We will use the notation H 1 (c) for the limit of the sequence lim T !1 H T c T . Since all sets H T c T are non-empty, compact and convex subsets of jRj 1 , the limit H 1 (c) inherits these properties.
Under Axiom (A4), ambiguity may persist or vanish in the limit depending on the similarity of cases to the situation under consideration. E.g., if c represents a statistical experiment w.r.t. the action of interest, i.e., c = (x 0 ; a 0 ; r) for some r 2 R, then it appears reasonable to assume that H 1 (c) = f r g, where r is the Dirichlet distribution putting mass 1 on r. However, if c includes the observation of an action distinct from a 0 , say, a 0 , there is no reason to suggest that the decision maker will be able to eliminate all ambiguity about the performance of action a even after observing an in nite sequence of realizations of a 0 . Hence, in general, the limit set will contain more than one element.
The next axiom requires those elements of (H 1 (c)) c2C which are singletons or segments to be non-collinear. for all c 2 C. This means that no three of the predictions related to the basic cases are collinear.
Intuitively, this excludes the possibility that the set of basic cases C can be reduced by taking the evidence from a given case c to be exactly equivalent to the evidence of a database containing observations of two different cases, c 0 and c 00 in a certain proportion. This requirement is satis ed, for controlled randomized experiments, i.e., for the cases of the type (x 0 ; a 0 ; r), for which ambiguity vanishes and the limit prediction can be reasonably assumed to be r .
However, ambiguity need not vanish for cases in which characteristics distinct from x 0 and a 0 have been observed. In this case, the only restriction imposed by Axiom (A5) concerns those sets H 1 (c) which are segments. We require that they are not collinear to any other two segments or points in the set (H 1 (c)) c2C . No assumptions are imposed on those sets in (H 1 (c)) c2C with a dimension 2 or higher.
Representation Theorem
The following theorem guarantees a unique similarity function for databases of arbitrary length. 
The proof of the Theorem is relegated to the Appendix. Note, however, how the axioms affect the representation. Axiom (A1) ensures that the prediction associated with a database depends only on the number and the frequency of the observations, but not on the order in which they arrive. Axiom (A2) implies the existence of weights s T (c) such that the predicted probability distributions associated with a database D 2 D T can be expressed as a weighted average of the predictions of the individual cases in this set. Without imposing further restrictions, the weights s T (c) will depend on the length of the database T and be non-unique. Axiom (A3)
yields independence of the similarity weights of the number of observations. Axioms (A4) and (A5) ensure uniqueness of the representation.
As in BGSS (2005), uniqueness cannot be guaranteed unless some of the predictions corresponding to cases in C are non-collinear. In contrast to the framework of BGSS (2005), in which the predictions from databases consisting of observations of a single case c are independent of the number of observations T; here the predictions depend on the number of observations. Hence, in order to deduce a unique similarity function, one could require non-collinearity for every value of T . An alternative, and in our opinion more intuitive approach, which is chosen here, is to ensure that the predictions from databases of increasing length converge to some limit set, Axiom (A4) ; and to guarantee non-collinearity of limit sets which are singletons or segments, Axiom (A5) : Then, for suf ciently large databases, there exists a selection of at least three predictions which are not collinear and which allow us to identify the similarity function uniquely.
Note that replacing Axioms (A2) and (A3) by the Axiom BGSS-Multiple Priors in Theorem 6.1 would imply that the correspondenceP ; and hence the predictions H (D) ; would be independent of the length of the database.
For some applications, the forecast of a decision maker about the outcome of a given action may be a unique probability distribution. Using the lower-case letter h to indicate the special case where H is a function rather than a correspondence, it is straightforward to rewrite our axioms for this special case. In particular, Axiom (A4), Learning, now reduces to the requirement that for each c 2 C, the sequence h T c T converges to some probability distribution h 1 (c).
Non-collinearity, Axiom (A5), now ensures that no three of these limit vectors will be collinear.
Hence, we obtain the following corollary to Theorem 6.1: such that for all T 2 and any D 2 D T ,
Allowing the predicted probability distribution to depend on the length of a database, Corollary 6.2 generalizes the result of BGSS (2005). The time-dependency of this representation allows us to model learning processes. For example, with increasing numbers of observations the predicted probability distribution may become less sensitive to new additional data. The following section provides examples from statistical models.
Examples and Applications
A special case of our approach are predictions based on homogenous databases which contain the same characteristics and actions in all observations. Hence, all data have the same similarity.
Homogenous databases result typically from controlled statistical experiments. In this context, it appears natural to assume that ambiguity decreases as new data con rm past evidence.
In this section we show by examples that several statistical procedures satisfy the axioms of Theorem 6.1. Moreover, we discuss situations where constant similarity appears natural and illustrate how our method can be used to select a probability distribution from a set of priors.
Frequentism
Consider a decision maker who observes the outcome of a statistical experiment, where the set of possible cases is given by C = ((x 0 ; a 0 ; r)) r2R . After observing a database D of length T and frequency f , the decision maker's beliefs about the outcome of action a 0 are described by
It is easy to check that this rule satis es all the axioms. This prediction rule has the special property that the prediction does not depend on the length of the database, but only on the observed frequency of cases.
Should the set of cases include also pairs of characteristics and actions different from (x 0 ; a 0 ) then the decision maker predicts a probability distributionp (x;a;r) over outcomes of action a 0 in circumstances x 0 the for each observed case (x; a; r) : The similarity weight s (x; a; r) describes the relevance of this case (x; a; r) for the prediction about (x 0 ; a 0 ). This is the case axiomatized by BGSS (2005).
Bayesianism and Full Bayesian Updating
Bayesian updating is one of the most prominent statistical learning rules. Its generalization to full Bayesian updating incorporates learning with multiple priors, see MARINACCI (2002) .
In both cases, predictions depend on the observed frequency as well as on the length of the database. Hence, neither of these rules satis es the Concatenation Axiom formulated by BGSS (2005) . Here, we show that both Bayesianism and full Bayesian updating constitute special cases of our approach.
As in MARINACCI (2002), consider a decision maker who is trying to learn the probability distribution over the outcomes in a statistical experiment where sampling takes place with replacement.
The set of possible cases is given by C = ((x 0 ; a 0 ; r)) r2R . Let D be a database of length
is the number of observations of r in D: Suppose that the decision maker's prior information is re ected by an initial set of priors P, consisting of Dirichlet distributions on jRj 1 . Then P can be described by the (strictly positive) parameters of these distributions, 1 ; :::; jRj . In particular, for a Dirichlet distribution with parameter k , the expected probability of outcome r in absence of any observations is given by The Bayesian update of a Dirichlet probability distribution on jRj 1 with parameters 1 ::: jRj after observing a database D is another Dirichlet distribution with parameters
Hence, full Bayesian updating on the set P implies that the decision maker updates each of the priors according to the Bayesian rule,
Standard Bayesian updating obtains as a special case where P is a singleton and H (D) is the probability distribution obtained by Bayesian updating.
Note that the order in which information arrives does not affect the posterior, hence Axiom (A1) is satis ed. Furthermore, let F , D 1 :::D n be databases of length T such that
There are strictly positive coef cients ( i ) n i=1 summing to 1 such that
are independent of T . Hence, we have Since the parameters 1 ::: n are strictly positive, it follows that all priors contained in H 0 assign strictly positive probabilities to all outcomes in R. Therefore, each of the sequences H (x 0 ; a 0 ; r)
T will converge to the unit vector assigning probability 1 to outcome r. Hence, Axiom (A4) ; is satis ed as well. Finally, since the limit sets coincide with the unit vectors in jRj 1 , Axiom (A5) holds.
Kernel Density Classi cation
In contrast to the previous examples, kernel methods are not restricted to databases generated from the same statistical experiment. Therefore, similarity plays a role. Consider the standard kernel density classi cation model 9 .
There are jRj classes and a set of objects each of which can be described by a vector of characteristics x 2 X. For instance, a physician might want to divide his patients into classes according to their reaction to a certain type of drug 10 . The physician observes cases of the form c = (x; r), in which a patient of type x has been classi ed into class r. The physician entertains a notion of closeness between the patients described by a similarity function s : C ! R.
Suppose that the reaction of a patient of type x 0 has to be classi ed. The information of the physician is given by a database D of length T .
The kernel density classi cation proceeds as follows 11 . Given the database D which contains the cases in which patients of different types have been classi ed, one needs to determine the relevance of these cases to the case at hand, i.e., the similarity of an observed patient x to x 0 .
Weighting the frequencies of cases in which outcome r has been observed by their similarities 9 See, e.g., HASTIE, TIBSHIRANI, AND FRIEDMAN (2001)(P. 184). 10 The classi cation may also be "action-dependent", e.g., one might be interested in classifying the patients relative to their risk of contracting a speci c desease, conditional on a treatment they have undergone (e.g. vaccination). 11 A similar problem showing that kernel density methods can be represented in terms of similarityweighted frequencies can be found in GILBOA (2009).
and normalizing, one obtains the probability that patient x 0 will show the reaction r,
withp (x;r) = r (the Dirichlet distributions concentrated on r). Note thatp (x;r) does not depend on the length of the database T .
Expression (2) implicitly assumes that, when collecting the data, no classi cation errors have occurred. Under this assumption, it is sensible to exclude all cases in which a patient has been assigned to a class different from r. Moreover, once a patient has been classi ed with a reaction r, the decision maker trusts that this classi cation is correct and assigns probability of 1 to patients of this type belonging to class r.
In practice such assumptions are hard to justify, since classi cations may be biased. Suppose for example, that the data come from classi cations made by different experts. Each expert observes only patients of a certain type and has the task to record their reaction. Assume that the expert dealing with class x classi es the patients correctly with probability 1 x and assigns them mistakenly with probability
to any of the remaining classes. If mistakes across experts are independent and if, in absence of better evidence, one assumes a uniform prior over the classes, then the physician will derive the following modi ed probability distribution,
where the probability distributionsp 
for all r 0 6 = r. In this case, Axiom (A1) trivially holds. We have already shown that Bayesian updating implies Axiom (A2) : Since the similarity function is independent of T , axiom (A3) applies as well. It is straightforward to check that Axiom (A4) holds, i.e., lim T !1p
Ambiguity may become relevant if the physician is uncertain about the magnitude of the mistake of the experts. For example, if he believes that the probability of misclassifying a type x lies in the interval [ x ; x ] (0; 1) ; he immediately has to deal with a set of probability distributionŝ
T jRj 1 ; :::
obtained by full Bayesian updating with respect to the probabilities in the set
Bayesian updating is consistent with Axioms (A2) and (A3) :
Hence, for an arbitrary database D of length T , the set of probability distributions
describes the (ambiguous) beliefs of the physician about the classi cation of the patient of type x 0 given the observations in D. Note that ambiguity vanishes, as more data become available and the physician learns the true classi cation scheme.
Constant Similarity
So far, we implicitly assumed that the similarity function is independent of the length and content of the observed data. In statistical analysis, however, the kernel width is usually chosen depending on the size of the database. The set of cases considered to be relevant for the classication of a case x 0 shrinks as the number of cases increases. In our model, this corresponds to a similarity function s T (x 0 ; x) which depends on T . With this modi cation, the representation in (3) would satisfy Axioms (A1), (A2) and (A4), but would violate Axiom (A3). Our Axioms would still allow us to determine the sets of probability distributionsP (x;r) T uniquely and to derive similarity values s T (x 0 ; x) for each x and T: For small values of T , however, these similarity values would no longer be uniquely identi ed
Reducing the kernel width as data accumulates re ects the assumption that large databases are more representative of the distribution of x, and, therefore, contain a larger fraction of highly relevant (or even identical) cases. However, if the number of observations increases without affecting the relative frequencies of cases, then there is no reason to adjust the similarity relation between cases. E.g., a physician with a long practice may encounter symptoms which he has never observed before. Consequently, he may nd it hard to associate these new cases with those in his (long) memory. In such a situation, it does not appear reasonable to require the similarity function to converge to the identity, even for long databases. Hence, if unexpected cases are likely to occur, Axiom (A3) may be viewed as a sensible rst approximation.
A non-constant similarity function may also re ect a decision maker's effort to learn about correlation between outcomes conditional on the characteristics. Consider, once again the classi cation problem discussed before and assume that two characteristics x and x 0 are very similar. If the physician has a database in which patients of types x and x 0 are associated with the same outcome, then this database will con rm the initial similarity perception. In contrast, if he observes that most patients of type x are classi ed as r, whereas most patients of type x 0 are classi ed as r 0 , it would be sensible to revise the similarity function. In such a case, the similarity function would depend not only on the length of the database, but also on the observed frequency of cases. Hence, both Axioms (A2) and (A3) would fail. Modelling an adjustment process of the similarity function according to the type and quantity of data is complicated by the fact that, to our knowledge, there is little systematic information in the literature about how people assess the relevance of observations.
Missing Data and Persistent Ambiguity
In contrast to BGSS (2004), we assume that decision makers experience ambiguity about their forecasts. GONZALES AND JAFFRAY (1998) attribute such ambiguity to missing data. In order to illustrate this possibility and how it can be incorporated in this approach, consider a physician who has to decide whether to prescribe a speci c treatment a to a patient with characteristics
x. He has a data-base in which the outcomes success, r = 1; or failure, r = 0; of treatment a, have been recorded for two types of patients with characteristics x and x 0 . Suppose that the physician has reasons to believe that the outcomes of treatment a are (perfectly) negatively correlated for patients with the two characteristics x and x 0 and, for simplicity, that all cases are equally relevant.
For long databases in which only outcome r = 1 has been recorded for type x, D = (x; a; r = 1) T ;
it is reasonable to expect that the treatment a will lead to success,P (x;a;1) T = f 1 g. The same prediction,P (x 0 ;a;0) T = f 1 g ; would obtain if the observed database were given by D 0 = (x 0 ; a; r = 0) T . Hence, for large databases, the probability of success can be assessed as:
Suppose that for some of the observations in the database the value of the characteristic, x or x 0 , has not been recorded. x is used to denote the fact that information about the characteristic is missing. In the extreme case of a database D = ( x; a; r = 1) T the physician cannot unambiguously determine the probability of success for the patient to be treated. Since the characteristic
x or x 0 has not been recorded, one cannot rule out that all patients in the database D are of type x, nor that all patients are of type x 0 . In the rst case, he would assign a probability of 1 to a success, in the second, a probability of 0. The ignorance about the distribution because of the imprecise data can be modelled by sets of priorsP Such indeterminacy does not depend on the length of the database and will not disappear as long as there are imprecise data.
Selection of a Prior by the Max-Min Rule
Most of the literature on ambiguity deals with decision rules based on preferences over acts.
Following ELLSBERG (1961) ambiguity aversion has become the dominant assumption about behavior under ambiguity. GILBOA AND SCHMEIDLER (1989) axiomatize a preference representation where the decision maker evaluates acts by the lowest expected utility of the act over all probabilities in a set of priors. Such conservative behavior is also recommended by the precautionary principle in environmental economics. Whatever the justi cation for the minimum rule, it selects a particular probability distribution from the set of priors. We will show by ex-ample that, whenever the set of priors of a the decision maker satis es the axioms proposed in this paper, then the probability distributions selected by the minimum principle will also obey these axioms as well 12 .
Reconsider the case of Example 4.2, in which the decision maker observes only draws from Urn 2. He wants to predict the outcome of a bet on a black ball drawn from this urn, action a 0 .
Suppose that the decision maker's beliefs are represented by a set of probability distributions as given by a correspondence H satisfying Axioms (A1) -(A5), e.g., the correspondence H in Equation (1).
Let the utility of the decision maker from a black ball been drawn from Urn 2 be 1, and 0 otherwise. Hence, u = (0; 1) is the utility vector associated with action a 0 . Consider the max-min rule, which selects the single probability distribution
. If a decision maker uses this probability distribution h min to form the expected utility of a 0 ; then his behavior will be governed by the max-min rule, as described in GILBOA AND MANSKI (2009) . We now demonstrate that the selection h min also satis es our Axioms.
Since H satis es Axiom (A1), Invariance, so does h min . Consider databases F , D 1 :::D n of length T such that D 1 ::: D n = F n . Then there exist positive coef cients j with P n j=1 j = 1 for which P n j=1 j f D j = f F holds. By Axiom, (A2), we have
for positive coef cients 13 j such that
12 Similar results can be established for the rule which selects the Steiner point of each set, as well as for the more general -max-min rule, see GHIRARDATO, MACCHERONI, AND MARINACCI (2004) and CHATEAUNEUF, EICHBERGER, AND GRANT (2007) . 13 It appears reasonable to assume that the decision maker in this example perceives all cases to be equally relevant for his evaluation, as, e.g., in the case of Equation (1). Hence, j = j can be assumed for all j 2 f1:::ng.
where h min j =: h min (2; a 0 j D j ) (note that for u = (0; 1), these values are unique). Hence,
implying that h min satis es the Axiom (A2).
Since the weights j are independent of T , Axiom (A3) is satis ed as well. For T ! 1,
T ! (0; 1) and H T 2; a 0 j (2; W ) T ! (1; 0). It follows that the associated probability distributions in h min will also converge to these values, implying that Learning, Axiom (A4) is satis ed. Since we have assumed only two outcomes, 0 and 1, Axiom (A5),
Non-collinearity, is trivially satis ed.
Concluding Remarks
Most of the literature on ambiguity takes the degree of ambiguity as a personal subjective characteristic. In particular, there is no formal reference to the information available to the decision maker. The amount of data is, however, likely to in uence both the forecast made by the decision maker and his con dence in this forecast. In this paper, we provided an approach which combines this intuition with the similarity-weighted frequency approach of BGSS (2005). We relax the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) by restricting it to databases of equal length.
We show that the main result of BGSS (2005), namely that the similarity function is unique, remains true if one imposes consistency on the weights across databases of different size. This consistency is essential for the uniqueness of the similarity weights.
If one views the perception of similarity as an imperfect substitute for knowledge about the relevance of underlying data, then a decision maker has to nd out which characteristics are payoff-relevant. Hence, the database may provide not only information about the distribution of payoffs, but also about the similarity of alternatives. One may conjecture that the more observations a database contains, the more precise the perception of similarity may become. PESKI (2007) 
Appendix A. Proofs
To prove Theorem 6.1, we proceed as follows. In a rst step, Lemma A.1 establishes the necessity of Axioms (A1), (A2) and (A3) for the representation. In the third step of the proof, we show that a correspondence H satisfying the Axioms (A1) - 
Proof of Lemma A.1:
It is obvious that for a given D 2 D T ,
does not depend on the order of cases observed in D, but only on their frequency and the length of D, T , hence Axiom (A1) is satis ed. To see that Axiom (A2) is satis ed, rst note that for all c 2 C and all T 2 f2; 3:::g,
Let F n = D 1 ::: D n for some n 2 N and some sets D 1 :::D n 2 D T , then
Hence,
2 int ( n 1 ) and, therefore, Axiom (A2) is satis ed.
Note further that does not depend on the length T of the databases D 1 :::D n and F , but only on their frequencies. Hence, if
for some k 2 N, it holds for any k 2 N, implying that Axiom (A3) holds.
Denote by Q jCj + \ jCj 1 the set of rational probability vectors of dimension jCj. The possible frequency vectors which can be generated by a database of length T are given by the set: (i) for all distinct f , f 0 and f 00 such that f + (1 ) f 0 = f 00 for some 2 (0; 1), there exists a 2 (0; 1) such that:
holds for all T such that f , f 0 and f 00 2 Q jCj T ; (ii) the sequences h T f j T 2f2;3:::g converge for all j 2 f1::: jCjg;
(iii) the set h 1 f j j2f1:::jCjg contains no three collinear vectors.
Then, there are positive numbers fs j g jCj j=1 , which are unique up to a multiplication by a positive number, and, for each T 2, there are unique probability vectors p
, such that for each
Proof of Proposition A.2:
We start with the following Lemma:
Lemma A.3 Assume that conditions (ii) and (iii) of Proposition A.2 hold. For any three distinct i, j and k 2 f1::: jCjg there exists a nite T fi;j;kg such that the vectors h T f l l2fi;j;kg are non-collinear for all T T fi;j;kg .
Proof of Lemma A.3:
Let d denote the distance between the point h 1 f i and the line through the two points h 1 f j and h 1 f k . Since the three points are non-collinear, d > 0. Since the sequences h T f l are converging for l 2 fi; j; kg, we know that for each l, there exists a T l such that for all T T l , h T f l is contained in a ball with a center in h 1 f l and with a ra-
, denoted by h T f l 2 B h1(f l ) (d=3). Let T fi;j;kg =: max l2fi;j;kg T l . Take any two points x j 2 B h1(f j ) (d=3) and x k 2 B h1(f k ) (d=3) and note that the line which connects these two points must be at a distance at least
Hence, x i , x j and x k cannot be collinear. Since for every T T fi;j;kg , and every l 2 fi; j; kg, Lemma A.4 For jCj 3, let fs j g jCj j=1 be a collection of similarity weights. For any T 2 and any f 2 Q jCj T , de ne the function g T (f ) by
Suppose that for some f 2 Q jCj T , we can show that
. Then,
Proof of Lemma A.4:
In particular,
for i 2 f1; 2; ::: jCjg.
, we have the desired result.
We now prove the result of Proposition A.2 for the case jCj = 3. For this case, de ne f =:
j and consider T = 3 T . Obviously, f 2 Q 3 3 T
. Let s 1 , s 2 and s 3 be the unique up to a multiplication by a positive number solution of the equation:
For any T 2 and any f 2 Q 3 T , de ne g T (f ) =:
. Obviously, g 3 T (f ) = h 3 T (f ).
Lemma A.4 then implies
In order to state our next Lemma, we de ne the rst simplicial partition of Q i k be its center of gravity. Let T 0 T be such that
Proof of Lemma A.5:
Observe that if (f 1 ; f 2 ) and (f 3 ; f 4 ) are non-collinear segments in Q
with the property that
where
In particular, let conv f 1 k ;f 
. Note that for any two i, j 2 f1; 2; 3g, i 6 = j and n = f1; 2; 3g n fi; jg, , and, hence,
Applying the claim inductively and using the result of Lemma A.4, we conclude that the functions h and g coincide on the set of all simplicial points.
To complete the proof of Proposition A.2 for the case of jCj = 3, it remains to show that the functions h and g coincide on the set of all rational points.
T and for all T 2.
Proof of Lemma A.6:
. Form a sequence T 1 :::T k ::: with T 1 = 6T and T k = 6T k 1 and take a sequence of simplicial triangles f 1 1 ;f
such that for each k,f
all i 2 f1; 2; 3g. It is obvious that this construction is possible for every f . We want to show
k , then by the de nition of g,
Since for all n 2 f1; 2; 3g, lim k!1p n T k = h 1 f n 2 2 , we have that for all r 2 R and all j 2 f1; 2; 3g
wherep n T k (r) and h 1 f n (r) denote the r th -components of the vectoresp n T k and h 1 f n , respectively. Hence,
for all j 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Suppose that for some i 2 f1; 2; 3g, i 6 =
, i.e. that there exists an > 0 such that:
we have that
Hence, it must be that:
which is equivalent to:
which reduces to
By presumption, the vectors h 1 f i i2f1;2;3g
are not collinear. Hence, (A-3) can be satis ed
for all i 2 f1; 2; 3g. It follows that h
Lemma A.6 completes the proof of Proposition A.2 for the case of jCj = 3.
Now consider the case of jCj > 3. 
Lemma A.7 For every subset K f1::: jCjg, h T (f ) = g T (f ) holds for every T 2 and
Proof of Lemma A.7:
We know that the claim is true for jKj = 3, so we assume that it is true for jKj = N and prove that it will hold for jKj = N + 1. Lemma A.8 Under Axiom (A5), it is possible to select vectors h 1 (c) 2 H 1 (c) for each c 2 C such that no three vectors in the set (h 1 (c)) c2C are collinear. Furthermore, for each c, there exists a T c 2 N and a sequence of vectorsĥ T c T 2 H T (c) T for T T c such that
Proof of Lemma A.8:
Denote the setC p to be the set of all cases c 2 C, such that H 1 (c) is of dimension p 2 f0; 1; ::: jRj 1g. To show that a selection of vectors h 1 (c) with the stated properties exists, rst set (h 1 (c)) to be the unique elements of each of the sets (H 1 (c)) c2C 0 . No three of these are collinear by Axiom (A5). Take a caseĉ 2C 1 . For a given segment (e; f ), de ne l (e; f ) to be the line containing the segment. Consider the set Lĉ = fl (h 1 (c 0 ) ; h 1 (c 00 ))g c 0 , c 00 2C 0 [ l (H 1 (c)) c2C 1 nl (H 1 (ĉ)) This is the set of all lines connecting any two singleton sets, as well as the collection of lines de ned by the segments in fH 1 (c)g c2C , excluding the line containing H 1 (ĉ) itself. Choose a point h 1 (ĉ) 2 H 1 (ĉ) such that h 1 (ĉ) 6 2 Lĉ. That this can be done is ensured by Axiom (A5).
We now show that no three of the sets fh 1 (c)g for c 2C 0 [ fĉg and H 1 (c) for c 2C 1 are collinear. First consider the combination of h 1 (ĉ) with any two points h 1 (c 0 ) and h 1 (c 00 )
with c 0 , c 00 2C 0 . Since h 1 (ĉ) 6 2 l (h 1 (c 0 ) ; h 1 (c 00 )), these are non-collinear.
Second, consider the combination of h 1 (ĉ) with a point h 1 (c 0 ), (c 0 2C 0 ), and a segment, H 1 (c 00 ), (c 00 2C 1 ). If h 1 (c 0 ) and H 1 (c 00 ) are collinear, then h 1 (ĉ) 6 2 l (H 1 (c 00 )) and, hence, the three sets are not collinear. If h 1 (c 0 ) and H 1 (c 00 ) are not collinear, then neither is the triple h 1 (ĉ), h 1 (c 0 ) and H 1 (c 00 ).
Last, consider the combination of h 1 (ĉ) with two segments H 1 (c 0 ) and H 1 (c 00 ) (c 0 , c 00 2C 1 ).
Axiom (A5) excludes the case in which all three of the sets H 1 (ĉ), H 1 (c 0 ) and H 1 (c 00 ) lie on the same line. Hence, at least one of these two segments, say H 1 (c 0 ) is non-collinear to H 1 (ĉ). It follows that h 1 (ĉ) 6 2 l (H 1 (c 0 )) ; which proves that the three sets h 1 (ĉ), H 1 (c 0 )
and H 1 (c 00 ) are non-collinear. We have thus shown that the new set of limit predictions de ned by: Proof of Theorem 6.1:
We show that we can represent the correspondence H as a collection of functions H =:
h : D ! jRj 1 satisfying the following conditions: for some 2 (0; 1), 
